Phishing in online banking: what hurdles remain in court against the bank after CJEU ruling C‑70/25

For phishing victims, the CJEU judgment of 15 October 2026 clearly improves the starting position: for unauthorised payments the bank must refund first, and can reclaim the money only if it proves concretely, in later proceedings, that the customer was grossly negligent. The early credit gives you liquidity and can make it easier to finance a liability dispute.

Attorney Ruhlmann

In its judgment of 15 October 2026 – C-70/25 (“Tukowiecka”), the CJEU has strengthened the position of people affected by unauthorised phishing payments: in principle, the bank must refund the amount without delay, even if it accuses the customer of gross negligence. Those affected therefore do not first have to fund a lengthy liability dispute; for an unauthorised payment transaction, the account is credited first. Who finally bears the loss is clarified separately, afterwards. In practice, this liquidity advantage can be considerable when it comes to enforcing your rights.

The point in time at which the refund is due, however, does not replace a detailed examination of the specific phishing attack. What remains decisive are in particular the authorisation, the technical processes and the question of whether there was gross negligence.

CJEU, judgment of 15 October 2026 – C-70/25, Tukowiecka: refund first, liability afterwards

The CJEU clearly separates two questions. First, for an unauthorised payment the bank must promptly credit the money back. Only then is it examined who must finally bear the loss. If a customer reports an unauthorised payment in good time, the bank may not refuse or delay the refund merely because it accuses the customer of gross negligence.

An exception applies only where there are concrete grounds to suspect that the customer is committing fraud himself. The bank must then report that suspicion in writing to the competent authority. It is not enough for the bank merely to claim that the customer was too careless with access data or security features. The bank may later try to prove gross negligence, but for an unauthorised payment it must refund the money first.

In Germany, the claim to a prompt refund for unauthorised payments arises from Section 675u sentence 2 of the Civil Code (BGB). If the customer has breached his duties intentionally or through gross negligence, the bank can later claim compensation under Section 675v BGB. The CJEU judgment, however, helps only if the customer himself did not approve the transfer. Whether the customer consented to a specific payment therefore remains particularly important in each individual case.

Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 22 July 2025 – XI ZR 107/24: still an important individual case

The wider case law shows what this means for final liability: the much-noted judgment of the Federal Court of Justice of 22 July 2025 – XI ZR 107/24 remains important. In that case, the Federal Court of Justice found a phishing victim grossly negligent. The decisive points were that the customer generated several TANs and passed them on to the perpetrators. From the second TAN at the latest, she could see the recipient IBAN and a high transfer amount on the TAN generator. There were also unusual phone calls and further warning signs. That does not mean, however, that the bank is right in every phishing case. Even after the CJEU judgment, whether the customer was so careless in the individual case that he or she must ultimately bear the loss is examined only after the refund.

The Federal Court of Justice judgment shows what matters in the later liability proceedings. For those affected, the point is this: the bank must set out and prove concretely what happened and why a particularly serious breach of the duty of care is supposed to have occurred. Each time, the questions need to be examined precisely. Were TANs actually passed on to the perpetrators? What information was visible at the time of approval? Were there several contacts, clear warning signs or time to reconsider? Only on the basis of these circumstances can it be assessed whether the bank can reclaim any money at all after the earlier refund.

My tactical advice for the actual liability proceedings: do not let banks fob you off with judgments decided on a fraud method that is one or two years old. Methods develop quickly, so what decides the case in court is a precise look at how the fraud happened in your specific case.

Attorney Ruhlmann

Authentication and authorisation are not the same

In disputes about online banking fraud, authentication and authorisation must be strictly distinguished. Authentication merely proves that a payment instrument or security feature was technically used. Authorisation, by contrast, requires that the customer consented to the specific payment transaction. A technically correct approval in an app therefore does not by itself prove that the customer understood and approved the economic content of the transaction. The approval may also have been obtained by deception.

Section 675w BGB first sets the bank's minimum burden of proof. It must set out and prove that the payment transaction was authenticated, properly recorded and booked, and that there was no technical malfunction. Where authorisation is disputed, the burden of proof is on the bank. Records of authentication are not necessarily enough in themselves to prove consent to the specific payment transaction, fraud, intent or gross negligence. The bank must therefore explain concretely which security feature was used for which transaction and how, and what legal conclusions can properly be drawn from that in the individual case. This also corresponds to Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 5 March 2024 – XI ZR 107/22, paras. 36 et seq.

The requirements for prima facie evidence in online banking

For prima facie evidence of authorisation in online banking, Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 26 January 2016 – XI ZR 91/14, is the key decision. According to it, prima facie evidence requires that the security procedure used is, on the current state of knowledge, practically impossible to defeat, and that it was applied correctly and worked without error in the specific case.

The bank therefore cannot rely on a general description of its system or on summary log extracts. It bears the burden of setting out and proving the conditions from which it wants to derive claims under Section 675v(3) BGB. In particular, the technically correct recording of the use of an authentication instrument does not automatically give rise to prima facie evidence of gross negligence. Whether there was a serious breach of care that is also subjectively wholly inexcusable has to be assessed on the basis of an overall evaluation. Even after C-70/25, this question still depends on the individual case; the order, however, is: refund first, examine liability afterwards.

External indications of misuse can undermine prima facie evidence

Victims do not have to prove a successful technical attack on the security system in order to undermine possible prima facie evidence. Circumstances outside the system can also be relevant. They include, for example, caller-ID spoofing, the perpetrators' knowledge of names and account details, a convincing-seeming conversation, forged text messages, unusual transaction patterns or a prompt criminal complaint.

What information was displayed to the customer during the approval process can also be decisive for the legal assessment. So can the specific way the TAN was used, in particular whether TANs were entered on a fake website, passed on by telephone or confirmed in an app in a situation brought about by deception. These circumstances can be decisive in assessing whether a payment was authorised and whether there was gross negligence. Under C-70/25, they are in principle weighed in the later examination of liability if the payment is first to be refunded as unauthorised.

Which documents and questions decide the case in court

In court, what matters is not only the amount of the loss. What is decisive above all is how the phishing attack unfolded, what documents the bank can produce on the payment transaction and what information was displayed to the customer at the time of approval. Those affected should inform the bank of the unauthorised transaction immediately, have online banking and cards blocked, consider filing a criminal complaint and secure all communications and approval data: pushTAN/TAN displays, screenshots, text messages and chats, call lists, account statements and correspondence with the bank. Prompt notification also matters for the immediate refund.

It then has to be examined whether the bank can prove a specific breach of duty or merely infers misconduct from the technical approval. Even if the bank has to refund first, it can assert final liability later. Gross negligence must be set out and proved concretely; a general reference to the technical authentication is not enough.

Conclusion: do not give up your claims too early

For bank customers, the CJEU judgment improves the procedural position. For an unauthorised phishing payment, the bank must in principle pay the money back first. Whether the customer must in the end bear the loss because of gross negligence is clarified only afterwards.

The later proceedings clarify whether the customer really approved the transfer, what information was visible at the TAN or app approval, and whether the bank can prove gross negligence concretely. The fact that a TAN or app was technically used shows at first only that the security procedure was used. It does not automatically prove that the customer consented to precisely this transfer, with this recipient and this amount, or acted with particular carelessness.

Those affected should report the incident immediately, have access and cards blocked, secure all messages and approval displays, and not give up their claims too early.

Legal position as of 17 October 2026.

KANZLEI RUHLMANN in Berlin, as a litigation firm for general civil law, represents you in liability disputes over online fraud – out of court where possible, resolutely in court where necessary.

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice in an individual case. It does not replace individual legal advice.